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Abstract  
This paper discusses EU energy and climate policy through the prism of multidimensional 
power. In so doing, it explores the forms of power EU policy draws from and employs. The 
paper argues that through its gas first policy the EU misuses its productive power and fails to 
shift structural power dynamics, while overplaying its institutional and compulsory power 
despite the EU’s obvious limitations regarding the former and impotency in the latter.  This 
mismatch between means and goals points to the need for an alternative power toolbox. This 
consists in the exercise of productive power to signify clean energy as the new normal; the use 
of structural/market coercive power to shape and regulate clean energy markets; and increased 
institutional power deriving from a comprehensive energy transition. This power toolbox 
relaxes the EU’s gas first policy shortcomings, cements EU energy security and supports the 
global uptake of energy transitions. 
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Introduction  
The study of energy and climate policy can only be conspicuous in the face of the fossil energy 
use-carbon emissions connection. In this context, energy security can be redefined to signify 
secure supply of energy at affordable costs within a strict carbon budget (Proedrou, 2018a). 
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The latter should be designed in such a way that it will contribute to the global goal of carbon 
emissions’ stabilization below the 450 parts per million (ppm), a threshold that would constrain 
temperature increase to maximum 2 degrees (preferably to 1.5 degrees as the 2015 Paris 
summit indicated) (Geels, 2014, p. 22). 
In the case of the EU, energy supply is based upon fossil fuels - indigenous coal, increasing 
consumption of mostly imported gas, and mostly imported oil - supplemented by a host of 
renewable sources (IEA, 2014, pp. 25-28). The share of solar and wind energy in particular has 
climbed up significantly, albeit from a very low base (Solorio and Jörgens, 2017). Against this 
background, the EU strives to ensure its energy security. Leaving affordability concerns aside, 
this paper focuses on supply security and sustainability, and aims to assess EU policy against 
these benchmark goals. The EU has approached both goals through a markets-based lens, by 
means of establishing a single energy market. Within this approach, the EU systematically aims 
to assist the development of market capacity and interconnections in gas trade, boost 
renewables capacity, and foment carbon trade (Buchan and Keay, 2015; Helm, 2014). To 
support their fulfilment, the European Energy Union established a mix of diverse, often 
inconsistent with one another, sets of policies, such as  diversification, interdependence, 
liberalization and full market integration, advanced solidarity, internal restructuring, 
electrification, de-carbonization and renewables promotion (Pellerin-Carlin, 2017, p. 72).,   
The policy focus on the central pillars of the evolving single energy market, however, gas and 
renewables/ emissions, has been rather uneven. The EU has progressively prioritized and 
securitized gas imports.  As a handful of official EU documents portray, gas has been steadily 
elevated as the key fuel for both supply security and climate goals, and thus acquired pivotal 
importance in the EU energy and climate policy. At the same time, the EU has weakened 
instruments and incentives for renewables generation and emissions reduction, thus running 
the danger of significantly compromising its climate performance (Hinrichs-Rahlwes, 2017). 
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This is clear in the watered down climate goals for 2030; the modest reforms of the still 
underperforming EU Emissions Trading System (ETS); and the reshuffling of state aid 
guidelines that weakens incentives for renewable energy generation.  
These shifts essentially signify a re-configuration of the EU’s power toolbox. Τhey also draw 
from and employ different forms of power in the service of the management of the EU’s energy 
and climate goals. Crucially, the exercise of different forms of power affects the EU’s capacity 
to attain its energy and climate objectives. The persistence of significant supply risks and a 
large emissions gap (UN Environment, 2017; Anderson and Broderick, 2017) point to a 
substantial capabilities-expectations gap (Hill, 1993) in the energy and climate realms. In what 
follows, the paper presents the multidimensional power conceptual framework upon which the 
analysis is premised, unpacks in a more elaborative fashion the changes underway, and 
critically discusses them under the rubric of different forms of power. In doing so, it assesses 
whether such changes are a match with the EU’s extant strengths and weaknesses, and 
subsequently suggests an alternative power toolbox to ensure EU energy security. The last 
section sums up the main findings, and provides relevant and consequent policy 
recommendations.  
 
The conceptual framework of multidimensional power  
Power inheres in diverse forms across all social and political settings. Since power is crucial 
as a means to achieve actors’ goals, and different forms of power can yield different effects, 
zooming in on the different forms of power actors employ is indispensable to assess their 
performance, account for their success or understand the reasons of policy failure, and 
demarcate space for policy change. Since different forms of power interact with and condition 
each other, their systematic discussion must be particularly insightful for the generation of 
conclusions regarding policy evaluation.  
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This paper strives to unpack which forms of power are central in EU energy and climate policy; 
how they interrelate; whether they yield the results anticipated; and whether the EU should 
rethink its power toolbox to effect more positive outcomes. By weaving together the different 
forms of power into a coherent narrative the paper aims to account for the capabilities-
expectations gap, disclose where the lack of capabilities inheres, and on this basis suggest a 
more appropriate power toolbox. 
We use the taxonomy of power suggested by Barnett and Duvall (2005) due to its breadth that 
encapsulates very different, and often disguised, forms of power. This framework, or elements 
thereof, has been applied in policy areas ranging from energy politics and international 
relations to tourism, among others (see Proedrou, 2018b; Casier, 2017; Hampton and 
Jeyacheya, 2015). In particular, Barnett and Duvall (2005) differentiate among four different 
kinds of power: 
 Compulsory power is usually equated with hard power and the capacity to impose 
one’s will on another actor 
 Institutional power encompasses all institutional arrangements that influence third 
states’ decision and policy-making  
 Structural power refers to power dynamics inhering in mutually constitutive 
relations, themselves premised upon the roles the parties possess within their 
relationship  
 Productive power refers to systems of signification, and constitutes what counts as 
mainstream, natural, possible and likely. It boils down to the production of meaning, 
and to the signification of the value and desirability of certain policies.   
  
While Barnett and Duvall (2005) also divide the four forms of power they suggest into direct 
and indirect modes of power exercise, the focus of the paper is on the former, as the EU 
5 
 
explicitly exerts direct power over its energy mix and resources, as well as its trade partners. 
Nevertheless, indirect, unintentional forms of power may also emerge and prove significant. 
We briefly extend the discussion in this regard towards the end of the analysis and in the 
conclusion.  
This multidimensional framework of power brings the complexity of power into the debate, 
and allows ample space for the investigation of diverse critical factors. By weaving together 
the central tenets of institutional, compulsory and structural power, and the disguised, albeit 
critical, form of productive power, and showing how they condition and interplay with each 
other, the paper  critically discusses what forms of power EU moves both constitute, and further 
require for the successful implementation of energy and climate policy. Premised upon this 
analysis, the paper assesses the effectiveness of the different forms of power employed, and 
sets out an alternative power toolbox more akin to EU energy and climate goals. In particular, 
the paper strives to establish: 
 How can we make sense of the recent turn in EU energy and climate policy under a 
multidimensional prism of power?  
 What do these changes mean for the EU’s toolbox required to achieve them?  
 Finally, can the EU make different use of these forms of power to strengthen its energy 
and climate policy?   
 
Unpacking power 
In this section, we focus on what the changes regarding the primacy of gas and the advent of 
the energy transition mean in terms of the use of productive, structural, institutional and 
compulsory power, whether they serve EU interests, and whether the EU can apply them in a 




The prioritization and securitization of gas imports  
Natural gas has been a central, and increasingly important, pillar of the EU energy security 
policy since the early 2000s (European Commission, 2000, 2006). This has been mainly due to 
its branding as a substitute to troublesome oil since the 1970s, and as the transition fuel in the 
climate change era. At the same time, gas is easy to store, a crucial asset for intermittent 
sources-based future energy systems, can be put to diverse end-uses and has the potential to 
de-carbonize in the future (Stern, 2017a).  
Since the early 2010s, gas’ importance has been further upgraded. This upgrade regards both 
the increasing frequency of policy focus on gas, as well as the new frames and policy 
instruments employed to accomplish secure gas supplies. The latter, in particular, has been the 
result of a securitization turn. Gas imports have been increasingly perceived as appropriate 
object of securitization, calling for and justifying a broad cohort of responses at the higher 
political level to enhance the EU’s gas import portfolio (Judges and Maltby, 2017). This 
prioritization and securitization of gas is manifest in a handful of deliberations within the EU. 
In particular: 
 EU member-states empowered the European Commission to negotiate with gas-rich 
Caspian states infrastructure and supply schemes (Maltby, 2013, p. 440).   
 The  European Energy Security Strategy (2014) focuses on gas supply security risks, 
and prioritized the implementation of no less than 27 gas projects.   
 The European Commission (2015, p. 4) even published an Energy Diplomacy Paper, 
highlighting the EU’s prime goal to enhance gas diversification through Central Asia, 
the East Mediterranean, and LNG trade.  
 The EU’s Security Strategy paper (2016, p. 22) further stresses the prioritization of gas 
imports and diversification.  
 The European Commission’s (2016b) LNG Strategy underlined the role of LNG in 
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achieving diversification  
 
These moves and documents render crystal clear the focus of the EU on increasing gas supply 
from external suppliers, and on fostering further diversification to ensure that these supplies 
will be secure. In light of the persistent deadlock over the previous 25 years regarding the 
opening up of new gas sources and routes of supply, inherent in this policy approach is a 
securitizing turn and the subsequent securitization of gas (Judge and Maltby, 2017). As the 
liberal-internationalist energy paradigm failed to lead to a functional pan-European gas market 
(Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2015, pp. 69-72, 85-6; Padgett, 2011;  Proedrou 2012, p. 
72), the EU intensifies its diplomatic efforts to enhance secure gas supplies, opens up its 
toolbox, and boosts the primacy of gas trade in its overall energy security strategy.  
Rather than this policy trajectory being exogenously given, it constitutes an EU decision among 
other options and constitutes a form of productive power per se. Productive power is one of 
the most important, but least recognized, forms of power. Those actors able to cede concrete 
meaning to certain policies, prioritize items in the political agenda, and set the grounds for what 
constitutes ‘normal and desirable’ practice enjoy significant advantages in the global scene 
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005, pp. 55-57). In the energy sector, fossil energy retains centre stage. 
This is because a host of actors, primarily fossil energy behemoths but also other economic and 
social actors across the energy systems chain, have managed to signify traditional, centralized, 
fossil-based energy systems as the most efficient, the indispensable and sole realistic option to 
ensure uninterrupted flows of energy, while masking their adverse effects (Miller, Iles and 
Jones, 2013, p. 144). As the EU energy mix and projections for future energy consumption 
betray (IEA, 2014), the EU operates within this conceptual framework of fossil fuels 
dominance. Gas, in particular, has been framed as the transition fuel, and has been signified as 
indispensable to guide a smooth transition towards low-carbon energy systems (European 
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Commission, 2014, pp.19-20). This framing, however, misrepresents gas’ impact on 
sustainability. First, instead of widely replacing and displacing coal and oil, coal and oil use 
remains high and gas competes with renewables squeezing the latter’s potential. Moreover, in 
line with the EU Paris commitments, the temporal horizon for gas use is limited. In its 2 degrees 
commitment, there is no place for any fossil fuel, including gas, after 2035. In its ‘well below 
2 degrees’ commitment, the EU fossil energy budget can stretch only as far as close to a decade 
(Anderson and Broderick, 2017). Such tight temporal horizons clash with contemporary 
investment plans on long-term gas supply contracts and pipelines (most emphatically the Nord 
Stream 2), which will lock-in gas consumption well beyond 2035, severely undermining 
sustainability goals (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2; Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 
2015, p. 49, 121).   
The particular exercise of productive power by means of the entrenched policy focus on gas 
carries critical ramifications for relations with other actors along the gas chain, as well as for 
gas trade patterns. It renders the gas field a terrain of contestation in which vital (energy) 
security interests are played out; these in their turn justify an expansive array of policy 
instruments drawing on different forms of power to bring the EU gas strategy to fruition.    
This is where structural power comes in. Structural power can only exist within, and derives 
from, the specific roles actors possess within a specified relationship (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 
pp. 52-55). In the context of gas trade, the EU possesses the role of the importer, and it is in 
light of this role that it faces certain contingencies and risks. In structural terms then, and 
premised upon the concrete way the EU exercises its productive power as presented above, the 
EU not only remains tied in a mutually constitutive relationship with external suppliers, but 
also increasingly renders this structural relationship more important, lopsided, and hence 
perilous. This is because its declared goal to increase gas imports will only entrench the 
structural relationship with third countries upwards the gas chain, and the risks that come along 
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with it. While interdependence is far from negative in itself, and can also translate into leverage 
and wherewithal to effect broader positive outcomes, it comes with sources of sensitivity and 
vulnerability (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The main argument here is that interdependence with 
Russia remains deeply problematic and risky, at the same time that diversification carries 
significant risks on its own that also merit significant scrutiny.  
This having been said, the EU has managed to circumscribe the leverage external gas players 
entertain through a combination of internal regulation and structural changes in the globalizing 
gas market. Subsequently, the EU has been able to equip itself against gas exports being used 
as a ‘foreign policy tool’ against it (Goldthau, 2016). Nevertheless, the EU’s dependence on 
Russia carries substantial risks. The turmoil in Ukraine has led to supply interruptions in 
Ukraine, raising the spectrum of another cut of gas supplies to European consumers. For 
southeast EU members in particular, any escalation of the conflict in Ukraine could effectively 
block the only route through which they can receive (Russian) gas (Jirušek, Vlček and 
Henderson, 2017). The Baltics and (south-)east European states remain not only largely 
dependent on Russian gas, but also poorly interconnected to withstand Russian supply cuts 
(Siddi, 2017b).    
Diversification may, in case successful, improve EU structural position in the EU-Russia gas 
trade, but will not alter broader producer-consumer relations and the EU’s fixed position within 
this relationship. To the contrary, diversification expands dependence on a wider number of 
exporters and transit countries, creating fresh contingencies. First, a substantial increase of 
imports through LNG trade will render EU gas security increasingly contingent upon the 
globalizing gas geopolitics and economics determined by the main producers (Russia, Qatar, 
the US) and the main consumer (China) (Grigas, 2017; Hulbert and Goldthau, 2013).  
Second, assuming Azerbaijan raises its gas production, transit risks emerge. Increasing imports 
from Azerbaijan means that Turkey will acquire a significant transit role. In light of the low 
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ebb in EU-Turkish relations and Turkish resurgent confrontational stance vis-à-vis Greece and 
Cyprus, transit through Turkey does not seem a prudent option. In case the Ukrainian corridor 
ceases to operate after 2019 and is gradually substituted by Turkish Stream (designed to carry 
Russian gas to Turkey under the Black Sea), Turkey will see its role upgraded to that of a gas 
hub transiting part of Russian and all of Azeri gas entering the European market (Siddi, 2017a). 
Turkish muscle will consequently strengthen, potentially creating fresh contingencies for 
European gas supply. A host of regulatory and contractual issues will also open up, as gas trade 
will shift from traditional exporter-importer exchanges to an entry and exit regime with on 
border purchases (Pirani and Yafimava, 2016).    
These caveats are important, but concern only the eventuality that further gas schemes 
materialize and diversification ensues. The state of the art is that the EU retains a narrow gas 
import portfolio, features high dependence on a few exporters, and can realistically import 
more gas only in LNG form as long as the gas glut remains. In all, both scenarios remain 
problematic: further diversification will bring risks of its own, while the state of the art has 
been consistently assessed as unsatisfactory and perilous (Judges and Maltby, 2017). 
In its quest to attract supply and infrastructure deals with gas producers, the EU has since the 
end of the Cold War heavily invested in its institutional power. Institutional power derives from 
actors’ capacity to establish, shape or enter institutional structures, set/ co-decide their 
objectives, procedures and norms, and within them utilize bargaining leverage to influence the 
position and policies of third states (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, pp. 51-52). In light of its import 
dependency, the EU has established a broad-ranging institutional energy framework. Through 
the cornerstone project of the Energy Charter Treaty that set the legal grounds for the creation 
of a liberal pan-European gas market, the EU aimed to project its political, economic and 
energy interests and norms to its periphery. Russia’s refusal to comply with and eventual 
decision to abandon the treaty in 2009 (Konoplyanik, 2017) has severely circumscribed the 
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Charter’s field of application, not least as it effectively blocks free gas trade from the Caspian 
westwards. The EU also established the Energy Community Treaty in 2006, in effect extending 
the EU energy acquis to the Balkans and some east European countries (Hunt and Karova, 
2010). It has to be underlined, however, that a potentially emerging gas hub, Turkey, retains 
only observer status, and aims to appropriate a role beyond transit functions (Padgett, 2011, 
pp. 1077-1084). Absent a functional pan-European energy market, bilateral sectoral dialogues, 
among which the EU-Russia energy dialogue naturally stands out, provide channels for 
fostering energy co-operation. Nevertheless, co-operation remains principally at a technical 
level; these forums have failed to mould the positions of third countries, most importantly 
Russia, and yield substantial, and favourable to the EU, changes in gas trade (Proedrou, 2012). 
In the same vein, the delegation of extra competencies to the European Commission, as the 
aggregator of the EU’s market wherewithal, with an eye to strike ground-breaking energy deals 
with Caspian producers has also failed to generate any tangible fruits.  
In the absence of any significant leverage deriving from productive, structural and institutional 
power, the EU seems willing to turn harder in its energy deliberations and exercise compulsory 
power. Compulsory power pinpoints to coercive modes of action (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 
pp. 49-51). Nevertheless, it seems paradoxical to suggest that the EU is in a good position to 
resort to compulsory power. First, this goes against its preference for low-politics, and its soft 
power and peaceful identity, enshrined in the concept of normative power (Manners, 2002). 
Although the EU (2016) has lately identified itself as a civilian power, zealous to use all kinds 
of non-military means to coerce third states into what the EU views as preferred course of 
action, two factors weaken this resolve. The first is internal, and refers to the difficulty of 
striking EU-28 foreign policy decisions and backing them up with appropriate means. What 
prevails in most cases are watered down, lowest common denominator solutions (Elgström and 
Jönsson, 2000). Secondly, the EU has failed to match third parties’ aggressive moves, including 
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military ones, and coerce them out of their tough stance.  
The cases of Russia and Turkey are emblematic. Russia did not hesitate to invade Georgia in 
2008, a move that met with only a lukewarm EU response. Moscow’s belligerent tactics in 
Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in spring 2014 have sparked Western sanctions, 
which, however, have produced little effect to Russian stance. Amidst the most severe post-
Cold War East-West crisis, Gazprom has interrupted supplies to Ukraine, potentially impacting 
EU gas security, a move that did not provoke any EU response beyond sanctions already 
applied (Pirani and Yafimava 2016, p. 16). 
The EU has also failed to back its energy policy with strong diplomacy in its effort to strike 
long-term energy co-operation schemes with Caspian producers (Proedrou, 2012, p. 73). 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan remain wired in the Soviet-era pipeline system, lack any feasible 
transportation options to carry their gas westwards, and are under pressure from Russia not to 
contemplate such schemes. Russia’s geopolitical weight with regard to decisions on pipelines 
crossing the Caspian contrasts emphatically with the EU’s lack of bargaining cards. The only 
Caspian producer lying west of the Caspian, furthermore, Azerbaijan, follows a multi-vector 
energy policy. Azerbaijan ships gas to Russia as well, this way reducing the amount of 
quantities available for export to the EU, and has not become a key exporter for the EU despite 
intensive EU gas diplomacy for decades (Proedrou, 2012).    
In the East Mediterranean front, Cyprus’ efforts to explore its oil and gas reserves within its 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have invited a fierce Turkish reaction. This has stretched to 
the presence of Turkish military vessels that obstructed drilling explorations in the Cypriot 
EEZ, to threats to any party implementing explorations within the Cypriot EEZ, and to 
statements of intent to conduct its own explorations in another country’s sovereign territory. 
The EU’s reaction has been stark rhetorically (EUObserver, 2018), but has hardly moved 
beyond its declaratory tone, nor coerced Turkey out of its tough stance. The capability-
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expectations gap (Hill, 1993) appears to be as real as ever (Table 1). 
In sum, gas prioritization and securitization has failed to reduce supply security risks, while 
threatening to perpetuate unsustainable practices into the future. The employed gas power 
toolbox has served neither supply security nor climate change mitigation (Table 2). 
 
Forms of power  Gas primacy and securitization  Productive power re-calibrated 
Productive Exacerbates gas primacy 
Squeezes space for clean energy 
Signifies gas trade as a field of 
contestation  
Re-signifies the new normal in 
energy affairs 
Shifts policy focus on clean energy 
Relaxes gas as a contestation field 
Structural  Retains importer status and 
associated dependency risks  
EU largely dissolves gas trade  
EU shapes clean energy markets  
Institutional  Circumscribed wherewithal to 
regulate gas trade 
Gas institutional shortcomings 
insignificant 
Leverage to encourage others to go 
sustainable increases    
Compulsory 
(speculated) 
The capability-expectations gap  Window opens for coercive market 
instruments   
Table 1: The effects of the contemporary and alternative power toolbox  
 
Implications for Gas primacy and securitization  Productive power re-calibrated 
Energy policy  Supply security risks remain  Gas supply risks recede  
Supply security through clean 
energy sources and systems  
Climate policy  Fossil lock-in effects  Sustainable climate goals can be 
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Unsustainable energy practices  met  
Table 2: EU energy and climate goals under the contemporary and alternative power 
toolbox  
 
The deceleration of climate policy   
The second critical change concerns the slowdown of EU climate policy. Since the 1990s the 
EU immersed into setting emissions reduction goals, mandating energy efficiency increases, 
fostering market-based instruments to achieve climate goals, and boosting renewables 
production through favourable fiscal policy (feed-in tariffs) and regulation (priority dispatch 
mechanism). By the mid of the running decade, however, climate change policy seemed to 
have lost steam (Hinrichs-Rahlwes, 2017). This slowdown can be traced to four concrete 
developments: 
 Despite the ample criticism of the EU ETS, reforms leading into its third stage in 2014 
have been rather modest. Some sectors still remain outside its orbit, and caps remain 
high with the effect that carbon prices do not rise to discourage fossil energy use and 
emissions (Pelerin-Carlin, 2017, pp. 85-86). The third stage failed both to 
institutionalize the indispensable, for the encouragement of renewables generation, 
floor cap-and-trade price, and to build into the system the progressive increase of 
carbon prices to stimulate and fast-track carbon emissions reduction (Proedrou, 2018a). 
The latest reforms in February 2018 will effect a slight increase in emissions prices as 
well as a reduction of overall permits post-2020. Nevertheless, under the fear of 
relocation of economic activity, the reforms have remained modest, effectively 
maintaining subsidies to the fossil industry.  
 The 2014 Energy Package came into force after fierce intra-EU deliberations. 
Following, and building upon, the 20-20-20 goals for 2020, the Package provides for 
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40 per cent emissions reduction, 27 per cent increase of renewables (but relinquishing 
commitments at national level), and 27 per cent increase of efficiency (a non-binding 
target) goals by 2030. The new Package has been criticized on three fronts: lacking 
grand ambition and being incongruent with increasing bars in climate policy; removing 
national renewable targets thus allowing members to relax renewables rollout; and, 
providing only for non-binding energy efficiency goals, thus weakening incentives for 
business to invest decisively in the efficiency direction (Buchan and Keay, 2015; Helm, 
2014; Pelerin-Carlin, 2017, p. 88). On the back of such criticisms, the EU agreed in 
2018 to increase its renewables and efficiency goals to 32 and 32.5 per cent respectively 
and to revise these targets upwards by 2023 (European Commission, 2018a). While this 
represents an interesting and encouraging development, it still does little to address the 
large emissions gap (UN Environment, 2017). Targets remain too low for effective 
climate mitigation, while the non-binding character of the energy efficiency target 
leaves the door open for non-implementation.    
 On the back of criticisms for raising the electricity bill, and arguments that renewables 
should no more compete in the market without fiscal stimuli, the European Commission 
has removed feed-in tariffs from its state aid toolbox (Solorio and Bocquillon, 2017, p. 
36). This banning remains a non-binding, soft law instrument, as it allows space for 
exceptions granted under certain circumstances. In February 2017, for example, the 
European Commission endorsed support schemes for three small-scale renewables 
projects in France. Nevertheless, the Commission’s promotion of tendering systems 
undermines renewables expansion. Empirical evidence from states that reverted to 
tendering systems reveals significantly lower investments on renewables projects, a 
development that indirectly favours traditional fossil energy use and interests 
(Balcombe, Rigby, and Azapagic, 2014; Solorio and Bocquillon, 2017, p. 36). To make 
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matters worse, debate is ongoing within the EU policy circles on whether renewables 
should lose priority access to the grid; in case this materializes, incentives for renewable 
generation will weaken further (Proedrou, 2018a). Such moves, actual and speculative, 
mirror the resilience of the fossil regime and the pressure it exerts on policy-making 
structures to hinder energy transitions (Geels, 2014; Bosman et al, 2018). 
 The EU has failed to supplement and empower energy transition pathways with further 
policy schemes across sectors, involving but not confined to taxation, investment and 
industrial policy. This having been said, the EU invests on the de-carbonization of the 
transport sector. It has drawn from several funds to utilize digital technologies and 
smart pricing in the transport sector, establish clean energy transportation systems, and 
encourage zero-emission vehicles. Rather than this being a pioneering exercise, though, 
it can be seen as long-needed action in a sector in which emissions reductions has been 
sluggish.  
 
These developments do not bode well with the broader emphasis the EU places in its energy 
and climate discourse on de-carbonization, energy transition and green growth. While these 
goals have been integrated horizontally into broader policy areas, such as the circular economy, 
industry, agriculture etc. (European Commission), the mechanisms to achieve them become 
increasingly diluted. At the same time, the weak link in the EU energy transition remains the 
de-stabilization of dominant fossil regimes, while boosting the new economy (Geels, 2014; 
Bosman et al, 2018). Hence, coal, oil and gas retain alarmingly high shares in the EU energy 
mix. Renewables production has risen as addendum rather than substitute to fossil fuels, and 
emissions have fallen compared to previous years, but far from sufficiently to meet rising 
climate bars (European Commission, 2017, p. 22; Geels, 2014, p. 36). While energy security 
and de-carbonization feature as complementary in the EU’s Energy Union Package, moreover, 
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they are in practice treated as antithetical and contradictory when the EU, in order to ensure 
smooth supplies, places emphasis on further gas supply that will lock-in further fossil use at 
the cost of renewables for decades. 
In essence, then, the EU’s productive power remains limited at best, as it fails to substantially 
redefine the new normal, the desirable  practice in energy affairs. Doing so, however, would 
be beneficial for a number of reasons. First, it would circumscribe the primacy of gas and 
consequently render other forms of power that the gas first policy requires and which the EU 
either lacks or underperforms in, redundant, or far less important. In particular, 
 the EU’s unfavourable structural position in the international gas trade would be relaxed 
 the repercussions deriving from its failure to bind gas exporters and transit states in 
favourable institutional structures would be limited, and  
 there would be no need for the EU to endeavour to extend its toolbox into areas of 
outright confrontation, punitive measures and perilous competition with other states 
upwards in the gas chain. 
 
Secondly, an alternative exercise of EU productive power would render clean energy sources 
and systems the new normal in energy affairs, this way opening up promising avenues for the 
fulfilment of both benchmark EU goals, supply security and climate change mitigation. The 
transition can range from an EU-wide electricity grid (Nicolaidis, 2010, p. 39) and a ‘bulk 
power’ utility-driven model of renewables expansion, to de-centralized modes of energy 
production and consumption, or a combination thereof. While in the former case intra-EU 
renewables trade will benefit some countries more than others, this should not be seen as cause 
for political concern. First, this is the case with intra-EU competition across sectors; there is no 
reason why the renewables case should be different/ problematic. Within a mutually agreed 
and adhered to common market, members are convinced that in the whole they all win in 
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absolute terms, and have little to fear from relative gains of fellow members. European 
integration by and large is based upon this axiom. Secondly, since energy is more efficiently 
used at source (Proedrou, 2018a, p. 81), extensive networks are one, but far from the ideal, 
mode of setting a clean energy market. Thirdly, concerned member-states can opt for increased 
energy efficiency to reduce renewables’ imports.  
Such an exercise of productive power requires a radical mindset change within policy-making 
circles, which will effectively reverse the fossil fix and put in its place a new clean energy 
regime. Its foundation will be climate targets that bridge the emissions gap. On this basis, 
policy-makers can re-calibrate energy and climate policy by means of agreeing to lower carbon 
caps and a higher floor carbon price, and bolstering efficiency and clean energy support 
mechanisms. 
Far from such a reversal being unrealistic, increasing pressure generated by rising international 
commitments to address the emissions gap, and low hanging fruits in terms of supply security 
deriving from the overhaul of the energy systems, constitute solid grounds for member-states 
to take this path. Member-states can choose the most palatable and feasible policy tools (fiscal 
stimuli, taxation, bans, regulation, standards etc.), and adjust energy practices to their 
endowments and contexts to maximize output and benefits (e.g. the South solar energy, the 
North wind and geothermal energy, urbanized environments energy efficiency, the islands de-
centralized forms of energy etc.). Based on its market-building competences, the Commission 
can play a pivotal role in supporting states’ de-carbonization schemes by allowing a flexible 
state aid guidelines matrix, incentivizing fossil divestment, encouraging niche clean energy 
innovations, and regulating the renewables and prosumers markets. 
As power relations inhere in contemporary energy systems, inertia, path-dependence and lock-
in effects should not be seen as passive phenomena, but fomented by the fossil regime’s 
resistance to a more profound energy transition (Geels, 2014; Bosman et al, 2018). Likewise, 
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successful low-carbon transitions require strong political support by powerful economic actors 
(fossil and clean energy industry) and civil society/ prosumers. The unsustainability of current 
fossil-based systems (van de Graaf and Zelli, 2016, p. 48), and the collapse of energy 
companies’ traditional business models (Akutsina, Rinaldi and Roy, 2016; Parag and Sovacool, 
2016; O’Sullivan, Overland and Sandalow, 2017, pp. 16-17), create conducive ground for the 
re-invention and transformation of the energy business. Member-states and the Commission 
must seize this opportunity and exploit the strong link that undercuts niche low-carbon 
innovations and fossil phase-out with an eye to win business support (Geels et al, 2017: 1243). 
Such support is critical not only as a starting point; it also creates positive feedback loops that 
can further empower the drive for transition (Meckling et al, 2015: 1170-1171).  
This new business landscape calls for meticulous attention to its social and distributional 
consequences to avert any backlashes (Geels et al, 2017: 1243-1244), as well as to the role of 
prosumers and demand-side measures. The European Commission’s Winter Package features 
these possibilities and establishes the EU’s intent to place more weight to this potential (EU, 
2016a). The initial framework in place facilitates and regulates the role of prosumers, 
introduces load management and electricity price variability, and encourages electro-mobility 
through plug-in vehicles (European Commission, 2017a). This framework remains at an infant 
stage, commensurate with the low level of renewables penetration and the limited number of 
prosumers, plug-in vehicles and associated infrastructure (European Commission, 2017a). 
Nevertheless, a more sophisticated and supportive framework of regulations and incentives is 
in demand to signal the exponential deployment of renewables and smart, clean energy 
systems, as well as win citizens endorsement and political support (Leal-Arcas et al, 2018, p. 
21-31).  
Such legislation opens a backdoor for a different trajectory of the energy transition. The EU 
can break beyond its market-building fixation, and support transition not only in terms of fuels 
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and systems, but also in terms of ownership structures and agents involved. This avenue can 
be pursued in case the business community resists change forcefully; as a bargaining chip in 
governments’ strategy to lure business into the energy transition; or as a very conscious attempt 
to redraw domestic (and European) politics and power constellations away from the market. 
Embracing a local-based, de-centralized model of energy transition, the EU can support self-
generation, distributed energy resources, mini-grids and local energy projects run by energy 
cooperatives and municipalities. This calls for a quite different sort of politics; it has to tap into 
collaboration with local actors and embrace a more localized and de-centralized mode of 
governance. This blueprint bears similarities with the German political system (where local 
energy systems abound and utilities have lost substantial market share, see Inderberg, Tews, 
and Turner, 2016) and bodes well with calls for a more flexible Union (Youngs, 2018). 
The exercise of productive power along these lines can stimulate EU structural, institutional 
and even modest compulsory power not only to strengthen its own sustainable supply, but also 
to encourage fast-track emissions reduction globally to achieve mitigation goals. To begin with, 
a profound EU energy transition will translate into substantial growth for the global clean 
energy market. The EU has ample space to (co-)shape the rules of the game, act as a global 
standards-setter and determine trade terms in ways that ensure sustainable supply of clean 
energy equipment/ flows. This is due to its ‘governmentalized power of technical and political 
standards’ (Kuus, 2010: 8), its market size and its capacity to ‘alter the beliefs of other actors 
over the likelihood of possible outcomes’, which more often than not lure them in trade 
cooperation with the EU in largely EU terms (Damro, 2012, p. 687).  
Such power exercise also has aspects of what Barnett and Duvall (2005) call indirect forms of 
power. The EU will reshuffle its energy system to serve its energy and climate goals, but in 
doing so will affect other states’ energy practices as well, for example through regulatory 
standardization, network codes and technical compatibility fixes. On the other hand, one should 
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not underestimate the EU regulatory state’s external effects, and EU ambition and proclivity to 
extend its regulatory space and externalize its policies and standards. This power exercise can 
thus also in many cases be direct. On top of that, it can unleash substantial compulsory power 
dynamics. In case the EU ties market access, trade preferences, loans and aid to third countries’ 
sustainable practices, it will utilize its structural power to coerce them into a particular change 
of course (Damro, 2012).  
By investing on a profound energy transition, moreover, the EU will relax the classical fossil 
energy-geopolitics link and initiate an exit from traditional fossil-based geopolitics. This 
thwarting of the geography of politics within rigid, pre-morphed spaces, and the subsequent 
reconfiguration of the spaces that underpin the unfolding of global politics (Kuus, 2010: 2) will 
render the EU more sustainable while improving access to and availability of energy (Proedrou, 
2018a). This is so for two reasons. First, clean energy investments will upend the traditional 
entanglement of energy security with grand strategy, which has served poorly the EU for 
decades. Second, contrary to averse gas trade dynamics, imports of clean energy equipment are 
of a one-off, rather than ubiquitous nature, and are more likely to take place in a competitive 
global market (Proedrou, 2018a). This contrasts with the oligopolistic, distorted global fossil 
energy market (see Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2015, pp. 16-17), and renders clean 
energy trade less susceptible to political manoeuvring.  
In this changing background, a comprehensive energy transition will endow the EU, whose 
institutional wherewithal currently suffers from EU fossil dependence and its ambiguous record 
as a low-carbon actor, with increasing credibility as an international partner.  At a practical 
level, showcasing that profound low-carbon energy transitions work can both inspire more 
ambitious goals, as well as provide blueprints for the uptake of similar policies in third 
countries (Table 1).     
To sum up, exercising EU productive power to signify a profound energy transition as the new 
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normal in energy affairs displaces the contingencies the entrenched gas policy creates; 
stimulates EU structural power in ensuring supply security within a strict carbon budget; and 
foments institutional, structural and even compulsory power in bolstering energy transitions 
globally. This amounts to a more promising power toolbox for EU energy and climate policy 
(Table 2).  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper used Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power to assess EU energy and climate 
policy. By employing their multidimensional framework, it aimed to locate the policy’s 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as explore a more suitable power toolbox for the EU. The 
analysis focused on the central, but often unscrutinized, role of productive power in shaping 
the normal and desirable in energy affairs, and how productive power requires, conditions and 
interplays with other forms of power.  
The entrenched policy focus on gas (productive power) engages the EU in gas trade links 
(structural power) in which supply security risks abound. It has led the EU to invest in the 
establishment of institutions that have failed to ensure EU supply security (institutional power), 
while as of lately it pushes the EU to speculate compulsory power measures to enhance its 
supply security. To the extent gas locks-in fossil consumption at the cost of renewables and in 
long time horizons, EU gas policy underserves EU climate policy as well. The 
multidimensional power analysis revealed that EU energy and climate goals appear 
incongruent with the gas power toolbox employed.   
On the same conceptual basis, the paper suggested the exercise of productive power in novel 
ways to render a deep energy transition the new normal and desirable in energy affairs. This, 
in combination with the EU’s structural power to set favourite clean energy trade terms, serves 
EU sustainable supply goals; cancels out the gas power toolbox and largely displaces its 
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contingencies; and foments the EU’s structural, institutional and modest compulsory power to 
bolster the upscale of energy transitions around the world. The employed multidimensional 
power framework can guide alternative conceptualizations leading to a power toolbox more 
akin to EU energy and climate goals.  
While Barnett and Duvall divide the four forms of power along a direct/ indirect dipole as well, 
this application of their framework is fraudulent on the aspects of indirect power exertion. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of an EU-wide low-carbon energy system constitutes a source 
of indirect power exercise vis-à-vis other actors. While there is hardly any space for such 
extrapolations in this paper, it would be interesting to study how such developments would 
affect lucrative fossil energy exporters.    
Finally, at the heart of this study lies the question how the EU can upend its entrenched energy 
policy against the still dominant fossil regime. The analysis focused on a co-optation strategy 
with the business community to establish a radically greener energy landscape, and/ or with 
local communities and prosumers to advance a de-centralized model of energy transition. As 
Bosman et al (2018) show in their case study of the port of Rotterdam transition, transitions 
become more feasible as economic and socio-political pressures intensify; traditional practices 
become unsustainable and hence less profitable and legitimate; and, some regime actors revisit 
elements of their strategy. At a time when traditional business models collapse, the role of 
politics is to capitalize on social pressures, ally with those regime actors willing to break loose, 
and smoothly guide business into more sustainable, legitimate and profitable trajectories 
through demand creation. In cases of fiercer business resistance, governments can engage 
closely with prosumers, local communities and municipalities, reshuffle the loci and agents of 
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